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1 Introduction
The optimal long-term contract in repeated moral hazard generally exhibits memory (Lam-
bert 1983, Rogerson 1985 and Chiappori et alii 1994). The decisions made by the agent
and the principal in the current period depend on past outcomes. With repeated contracts
the principal is able to learn from the agents past history and, hence, propose a long-term
contract that internalizes this information over time. The benet is that risk sharing is
improved. A natural application of long-term contracting is in nancial intermediation
where banks and borrowers tend to maintain durable relationships and moral hazard is a
key problem (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983). It has been proved that, thank to memory,
a long-term credit contract benets the borrower under the forms of lower interest rates
and less collateral demands (Boot and Thakor 1994). However, other models predict that
the duration of the bank-borrower relationship in fact increases the borrowing cost because
its benets also create for the borrower switching costs to start a new relationship with
a competitor (Greenbaum et alii 1989 and Sharpe 1990). The benets of the reduction
in moral risk through memory would thus be o¤set by the market power gained by the
bank. These conicting predictions are reproduced by the empirical literature. Berger and
Udell (1995) and Bodenhorn (2003) nd a negative relationship between duration of the
bank-borrower relationship and borrowing cost or collateral demands. Degryse and Van
Cayseele (2000) nd in contrast that the loan rate increases with the duration of the bank-
borrower relationship. Neither result is conrmed by other studies in which no statistically
signicant correlation obtains (Blackwell and Winters 1997, Petersen and Rajan 1994, Cole
1998 and Elsas and Krahnen 1998). This inconclusive empirical evidence illustrates that
the borrowing cost may not only be a function of duration but also of other factors. It tends
to increase with the amount of credit, the riskiness of the project and market power but
tends to decrease with competition. In addition, banks use the borrowing cost to sort out
borrowers and eliminate the ones with the highest probability of default. It is therefore an
instrument to deal with both adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
The e¤ect of memory is then di¢ cult to capture.
We argue that the method used so far by the empirical literature is awed. It pools
all rms whatever the duration (or frequency or intensity) of the relationship with their
bank, and estimates the e¤ect of duration on the borrowing cost. The problem is that the
borrowing cost can vary across rms not only because of the duration of the relationship
but also as a result of the banksscreening policy to face adverse selection. In other words,
this method is unable to disentangle the e¤ects of adverse selection and moral hazard on
the level of borrowing cost, which in turn prevents from identifying the e¤ect of memory.
The present paper proposes a di¤erent empirical strategy to overcome this problem.
First of all, like in the rest of the literature, we focus on one single bank to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in lending policy. We built an original database from data made
public by the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
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on all its investments in private and public rms during the rst years of its existence
(1991-2003).1 Second, our dataset allows us to split it into two subpopulations: rms
having signed one single contract and rms having signed more than one contract. Then,we
control for the adverse selection e¤ect. In both subpopulations, the amount of lending and
the type of contract set for each rm reects the screening policy of the bank (as suggested
in Gathak, 1999). In the subpopulation of the several-contracts rms there obviously exists
for the bank information on the rmspast actions. The question is: will the bank use it?
We run regressions in each of the two subpopulations. If the same results obtain, this means
that the bank does not use the past history of its clients in designing contracts. Our results
clearly show that it is not the case. The total project value of the st signed contracts is
neatly identied as the dominant individual xed e¤ect to design contracts for rms which
signed more than one.
However, this result could be driven by the e¤ect of competition. The bank could in-
deed charge lower borrowing cost to its long-term clients in order to prevent them from
going to competitors. The specicity of the EBRD enables us to rule out this possibil-
ity. The EBRD was created in 1991 just after the Soviet Bloc had collapsed to assist the
countries of this region in transforming their centrally planned economic systems into mar-
ket economies. When it started its lending operations in 1991, the business environment
of all these countries was characterized by large output fall, complete disorganization of
production, macroeconomic and political instability and inadequate banking sector. This
exceptional situation makes the EBRD experience an interesting natural experiment for
two reasons. First, the management of risk had to be carried out in a very uncertain en-
vironment. The country risk was high due to the macroeconomic turmoil and all potential
borrowers had no market experience neither creditworthiness history. Second, its decisions
were not a¤ected by competition because local banks were insolvent and foreign banks did
not enter these risky markets in the early transition period. Moreover, the public share-
holders of the EBRD assigned to the bank the mission to lead the nancial ows to these
countries and not to crowd out private investment ows. Therefore, the EBRD was in a
situation of monopoly.
The control for the adverse selection e¤ect and the monopolistic behavior of the EBRD
o¤er ideal conditions to test memory in long-term credit contracting. Our estimations yield
unambiguous results validating the predictions of contract theory on repeated moral hazard.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the model of
the EBRD-client relationship. The data and descriptive statistics are presented in section
3. Section 4 examines the econometric analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes.
1Any local or foreign rm is eligible for EBRD nancing
3
2 The EBRD-client relationship
2.1 The EBRD
With a capital of 20 billion euros and owned by 61 countries and two intergovernmental
institutions (the European Union and the European Investment Bank), the EBRD is a
peculiar investment bank. Its main characteristics are the following:
 Unlike private investment banks, the EBRD has sovereign shareholders that do not
receive dividends.
 Its investments are geographically restricted to the region of the former Soviet Bloc.
 Unlike the World Bank, the EBRD invests mainly in private enterprises. According
to our calculations, the share of public clients between 1991 and 2003 does not exceed
12:5% of the total for a share of cumulated investment of 23%.
 Its investments have to respect environmental standards.
 Its mandate stipulates that it must only work in countries that are committed to
democratic principles. Nevertheless, some investments have been realized in certain
countries that are far from being fully-edged democracies.
On a theoretical point of view, we consider the objective function of the EBRD as
identical as that of any investment bank. Its objective is to maximize prots from investment
projects and do so by using all the instruments available on the nancial markets to raise
funds and protect its portfolio against risks.2 Figure 1 describes the EBRD performance
over time.
However, its constraints are di¤erent. It must invest in a restricted geographic area
precluding it to diversify its portfolio with investments in safer places in the rest of the
world. Therefore, in this respect, the EBRD faces a harder constraint than any other
investment bank. On the other hand, its sovereign shareholders guarantee it virtually
against bankruptcy, which is far from the case for any other private investment bank. This
feature together with its stable sovereign ownership allows the EBRD to raise funds at the
best conditions and, simultaneously, face the high risks inherent to the investments in the
region.
2 In fact, the objectives of the EBRD are not totally identical to those of other investment banks. The
EBRD aims at being a catalyst for nancial institutions and wants to avoid crowding them out. In other
words, the EBRD does not see other nancial institutions as competitors. However, in the bank-client
relationship, which is our concern in this paper, its objective is to maximize prots from its clientsprojects,
i.e., according to the EBRDs statement, to apply "sound banking principles".
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Figure 1: EBRD performance (e million) (Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
2.2 The theoretical model
Our theoretical model aims at designing an optimal contract signed under moral hazard
conditions (as in Lambert (1983) and Chiappori-Macho Stadler (1990)). First, we consider
one stage game corresponding to a contract running for one period. The bank and its client
agree on signing the contract; then, the bank nances the rm which realizes the investment
and pays back the loan (plus interests) to the bank.3 Second, we consider a contract that
lasts for two periods. In this two-stage game, the bank grants a loan in two distinct periods.
After the signature of the contract by both parties, the bank delivers a part of the loan to
the rm that starts the investment. At the end of the rst period, the bank observes the
results of the rms investment and decides at which condition to lend the remaining part
of the loan. We therefore assume that the contract signed in the rst period is binding: the
bank has to give the second part of the loan to the rm but can change the conditions if
the rm does not behave well in the rst period. It is in this second type of contract that
the incompleteness problem arises and the role of memory turns out to be fundamental.
3 In this section, for sake of simplicity, we identify as loan any kind of credit contract the bank can grant.
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2.2.1 Simple principal-agent model
The most simple credit line model involving a principal-agent relationship is structured as
followed: the bank (the principal) lends an amount of moneyM to the rm (the agent) and
asks a refund of R if the rms investment is successful, a refund R otherwise (R >R). The
rm uses M to realize an investment. If the rm provides the good e¤ort H, the return of
the investment is I and it has to pay back R to the bank. If it provides the low e¤ort L, the
return of the investment is I and it has to pay back R. The benet is assumed to be higher
when the rm provides a high e¤ort : (I  R)>(I R)>0. However, the higher e¤ort costs
VH to the rm. It is assumed that the application process for a loan costs a strictly positive
amount C to the rm. If the bank turns down the application the rm incurs the loss C.If
the bank accepts the application, it sets the conditions of the loan and the rm has to agree
with them. If the rm disagrees it has to pay C.4 The bank is assumed to be risk neutral
and the rm risk neutral with a limited liability. The liability condition ensures that the
investment return is su¢ cient to cover the capital that the rm has to pay back plus the
initial sunk cost C. The task of the bank is then to choose the right incentive to induce
the rm to provide the maximum e¤ort in order to make both the investment successful
and yield the highest return (and hence the highest refund for the bank). The investment
will be successful with probability Pi (for i = H;L) and will fail with probability Pi (for
i = H;L).
In the one-stage contract, the bank faces the following maximization program:
max
R;R
PH(R M) + PH(R M) (1)
PH(I  R) + PH(I  R)  C   VH  0; (2)
(PH   PL)[(I   I)  (R R)]  VH ; (3)
and I  R+ C; I  R+ C; (4)
where (1) is the utility function of the bank, inequality (2) is the participation constraint
of the rm and inequality (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm and
inequalities (4) are the limited liability conditions of the rm.
Given the banks utility function, we are interested in dening the optimal contract
under which the rm chooses the high e¤ort such as to obtain I. Since the objective
4According to the mechanism of the model it is not rational for the rm to reject the application when
accepted by the bank.
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function is linear in R, the solution of the problem is given by substituting constraint (3)
into (2).
For PH > PL we obtain the following equilibrium results :
R = I   C   VH

PL
PH   PL

; R = I   C + VH

PL
PH   PL

: (5)
These are the two solutions for the existence of a separating equilibrium that guarantees
the existence of an optimal contract. Such a contract allows the bank to distinguish the
two possible behaviors of the rm and reward them in a di¤erent way in order to incite
the rm to choose the higher e¤ort. Nevertheless, the two solutions (5) must satisfy the
liability conditions (4).
Since the bank wants to force the rm to make the maximum e¤ort, as in a standard
moral hazard problem (see Macho Stadler and Pérez Castrillo, 2000), the principal (the
bank) has to incur a cost which implies reducing its prots in comparison to a situation
without moral hazard. In order to make the rm behave well, the bank o¤ers the following
contract which turns out to be Pareto optimal :
R = I   C   VH

1
PH   PL

; R = I   C: (6)
If the investment fails the bank extracts all the surplus of the rm. If it is successful
the rm receives a premium reducing the prots of the bank. This threat is credible since
the rm has an incentive to provide the higher e¤ort.
2.3 The two-period model: the role of the memory
In the previous section the amount of the loan, once accepted by the bank, was delivered
to the rm all at once. In this section, we assume that it is paid in two steps. The problem
faced by the bank therefore becomes dynamic. At the beginning of the rst period, the
bank determines the total amount of the loan and delivers the rst part to the rm. In the
second period, it always delivers the second part but can change the conditions at which
the loan must be paid back.
In a two period loan, two scenarios are possible depending on whether the two stages are
independent or not. If the stages are independent, the nal result is the sum of the results
of two one-stage games. Such a contract is nevertheless an incomplete one. Chiappori et
al. (1994) prove that the long-term relationship can outperform a succession of day by
day agreements if the role of memory is taken into account. To obtain this result, the
principals objective function must be time-separable and the current behavior must a¤ect
the probability of the current outcome. Under these assumptions the bank can write a
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long-term renegotiation proof contract by adapting the terms of the contract in the second
period with respect to the return of the rms investment in the rst period. Therefore,
the bank keeps in memory the return of the rms rst-period investment. The structure
of such a contract is optimal; neither the principal (bank) nor the agent (the rm) has an
incentive to deviate and sign a new contract.
In order to formalize memory in our setting, it is assumed that the utility function
of the bank is time-separable and the prots of the second period are related to the outcome
of the rst one.5 The rm has to pay back R2 if the investment is successful in both periods,
R2 if it is a failure in both periods, R
0
2 if it is a success in the rst period, but a failure
in the second one, and R
0
2 if it is a failure in the rst period and a success in the second
one. We dene four returns of the investment for the rm in the second period as I2 (for
success in both periods), I2 (for failure in both periods), I
0
2 (for failure in the rst period
and success in the second one), and I
0
2 (for success in the rst period and failure in the
second one). We also assume that the bank commits to give the same amount of money to
the rm both in case of failure and success in the rst period. As before, we impose limited
liability (conditions 12). All the constraints take the role of memory into account. In the
second period rms do not have to pay the cost C as in the rst period but the bank has to
build a device to force the rm to behave well in both periods. This device is represented
by a premium which is a debt reduction in period two if the rm behaves well in period
one or a debt increase otherwise. Finally, it is assume that, for a given level of e¤ort, the
probability of failure or success of an investment is the same in both periods.
Given all the previous assumptions the problem is dened as follows:
max
R2;R2;R
0
2;R
0
2
PH [PH(R2  M) + PH(R02  M)] + PH [PH(R
0
2  M) + PH(R
0
2  M)] (7)
PH(I2  R2) + PH(I 02  R
0
2)  VH  0; (8)
PH(I
0
2  R
0
2) + PH(I2  R2)  VH  0; (9)
(PH   PL)[(I2   I 02)  (R2  R
0
2)]  VH ; (10)
(PH   PL)[(I 02   I2)  (R
0
2  R2)]  VH ; (11)
5 In the second period, the bank lends to the rm the amount of money originally stipulated in the
contract. The bank can only change the pay-back conditions of the second-period part of the loan according
to the behavior of the rm in the rst period.
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and R2  I2    C;R2  I2 +  C;R02  I
0
2    C;R
0
2  I
0
2 +  C; (12)
where (7) is the utility function of the bank when there are two periods. The number
of the constraints increases with the number of the additional variables we introduce. In-
equalities (8), (9), (10), and (11) are respectively the new participation and the incentive
compatibility constraints. As mentioned earlier, conditions (12) are the limited liability
constraints.
The objective function of the bank is linear in the variables R2; R2; R
0
2; R
0
2 and the
constraints are linearly independent.
We solve the problem as previously with respect to the corresponding constraints and
we obtain for PH > PL:
R
0
2 = I
0
2 + VH

PL
PH   PL

; R
0
2 = I
0
2   VH

PL
PH   PL

; (13)
R2 = I2   VH

PL
PH   PL

; R2 = I2 + VH

PL
PH   PL

: (14)
By comparing these results with the liability constraints we obtain four di¤erent optimal
values of the amount of money the rm has to pay back to the bank corresponding to
four di¤erent situations. Hence, the optimal equilibrium values for the renegotiation proof
contracts are :
R
0
2 = I
0
2+; R
0
2 = I
0
2 VH

1
PH   PL

+; R2 = I
0
2 VH

1
PH   PL

 ; R2 = I2 
(15)
The optimal strategy of the bank in the second period is to propose four di¤erent
contracts to the rm according to the results obtained in the rst period. These contrats
are Pareto optimal contracts since no agent has an incentive to deviate from the given
strategy. Hence, this set of solutions are four renegotiation proof contracts, and no protable
deviating behavior is allowed. Therefore, these four di¤erent contracts that describe the
optimal strategy of the bank when it values the past behavior of a client.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We have built an original database from data made public by the EBRD over the years. Our
database includes 1788 nancial contracts signed by the bank with private and public clients
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from 1991 to 2003. It contains information on the identity of the clients, the amount of the
contract in ECU/Euros, the value of the investment project, the sector of investment, the
nationality of the client, the year of the signature of the contract, the type of contract (loan,
share, equity and guarantee), and other characteristics (old clients, private/public, macro-
programs...). In this section we present a brief overview of the contents of our database and
we discuss the most relevant results of a simple descriptive analysis.
3.1 The contracts
The number of contracts and the amount of the annual investments were very low at the
beginning of the transition process (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The EBRD was underusing
its capital which was subject to criticism among the shareholders and commentators. This
underuse was principally due, to a large extent, of the severe macroeconomic downturn that
the entire region su¤ered.
After these initial di¢ culties, the target of the bank was to strongly increase the volume
of the portfolio. The recovery of most of the countries in the region helped the EBRD in
increasingly signing contracts and make sizable prots from 1999 on.
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Figure 2: Number of contracts signed by the EBRD between 1991-2003
The average EBRD investment has been remarkably stable with a slight downward trend
in the most recent years (see Figure 4).
According to the information available on the EBRD website, the bank designed dif-
ferent kinds of contracts. They all represent the nancial instruments by which the bank
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Figure 3: EBRD Investments by year (ECU/C= million)
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Figure 4: Average EBRD investment by year (ECU/C= million)
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participates in the realization of the investment project proposed by the borrower.These
contracts not only di¤er in the maturity of the credits but also in other characteristics that
we will discuss below. First, in Table 1 we provide a general overview of the di¤erent kind
of contracts signed by the bank and their frequency:
[Table 1 about here]
Three main categories of credit instruments can be distinguished: loan, guarantee, and
share and equity contracts. Loans have been the most used nancial contract by the EBRD
between 1991 and 2003 (Figure 5).
A loan is generally considered as a short-term contract, lasting 5 years on average, and
tailored as to meet the particular requirements of the project. The credit risk is usually
taken by the bank or partially syndicated to the market. A loan may be securitized by a
borrowers asset and/or converted into shares or be equity-linked. The second important
category of contracts includes share and equity. Share-type contracts were mainly signed
at the beginning of the EBRDs activity while equity contracts represent a large category
of nancial contracts including share contracts. An equity investment can be undertaken in
various forms, including subscription to ordinary shares. When the EBRD takes an equity
stake it expects an appropriate return on its investment. The bank usually sells its equity
investment on a non-recourse base, has a clear exit strategy and only takes a minority
position.6 The third category of credit instruments refers to guarantee contracts. They
have been used mainly at the end of the period. By this type of contract, the bank helps
borrowers in gaining access to nancial sources through the provision of guarantees (EBRD,
1999).
Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics on the total values of projects that have been
selected by the EBRD and the parts (bank nancing) that were e¤ectively nanced. In most
of accepted projects, the EBRD is not the unique source of fund. The statistic information
is given for the total sample and two parts of it, at the outset of transition (1993-1995)
and at the end of the sample period (2000-2003). The total project value of loans is always
higher than that of shares, but both have decreased over time. The median bank nancing
in loan contracts has been unchanged over time while it has declined in share contracts.
Figure 6 compares the fraction of the total project value nanced by EBRD between
share and loan contracts. This fraction increases proportionally with the total project value
but the increase is more pronunced for shares than for loans. As a shareholder the bank can
control the managment of the rm which implies the reduction of the uncertainty associated
to the imperfect information about the rm behavior. The bank tends to augment its
participation with the size of the project value in share contracts in order to protect itself
against the risk. As for loans, the collateral insures a proper control of the risk.
6Equity is considered as a non contingent contract.
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Figure 5: Financial contracts by type in percentage by year
[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
We also split the sample into two subgroups of rms:7 a rst group with rms having
obtained one credit over the sample period (around 1270 rms) and a second group with
those having signed more than one contract (around 100 rms). Table 4 and 5 show data
for single-contract and several-contract rms respectively. The median bank nancing part
for several-contract rms is always more important than for single-contract rms. These
di¤erences may be associated to reputation premia.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
3.2 Countries and sectors
There are two criteria that can account for the geographical distribution of contracts be-
tween 1991-2003: market size (population size or income per-capita), and political regime.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the geographical distribution of the EBRD investments in
cumulated terms by country and per-capita by country.
7This split of the sample will be essential to test the role of the memory on the bank behavior in the
econometric exercise.
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Figure 6: Fraction of EBRD nancing in share and loan contracts (red points and dashed
line for shares, and blu points and line stand for loans)
Russia has received more credits than any other country in the region over the period
followed by the Eastern European countries, and then by the Central Asian countries.The
latter countries not only o¤er poor business climate and also non democratic institutions.
In terms of the cumulated amount of investments per-capita, the ranking among the desti-
nation countries is substantially reversed in the upper half of the distribution. The Central
European countries, which are the most developped countries of the sample and leading
the transition process, have received the largest per-capita nancing (around 300 thousand
Euro for Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia) while the Central Asia countries still lag very much
behind. According to this second criterion, Russia moves down to the lower half of the
distribution.
[Table 6 about here]
We split the distribution into three sub-periods (1991-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003).
Table 6 shows that at beginning of the transition process almost half of the investments
went to the earlier starters, Central Europe and the Baltic states. Then their share reduced
to roughly one third of the total. Along with the transition process, Russia received and
increasing part of the the EBRD investments and its share has remained stable. South-
Eastern Europe has seen a progressive increase in its share of the EBRD investments over
the period. The relative share of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus has decreased. Finally,
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Figure 7: Cumulated EBRD investment by country (C= million)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Slo
ve
nia
Cr
oa
tia
Es
ton
ia
FY
R 
Ma
ce
do
nia
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ary
La
tvi
a
Lit
hu
an
ia
Ro
ma
nia
Bu
lga
ria
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
Po
lan
d
Ka
za
kh
sta
n
Al
ba
nia
Bo
sn
ia/
He
rze
go
vin
a
Ru
ss
ia
Mo
ldo
va
Se
rb
ia/
Mo
nte
ne
gr
o
Ge
or
gia
Tu
rkm
en
ist
an
Az
erb
aij
an
Ar
me
nia
Uk
rai
ne
Ky
rg
yz
 R
ep
ub
lic
Uz
be
kis
tan
Be
lar
us
Ta
jik
ist
an
Figure 8: Cumulated EBRD investments per capita by country (C= thousands)
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the Central Asian countries reached a noticeable share between 1996-1999 which fell by half
in the last period.
[Table 7 about here]
As for the distribution by sector (Table 7), at the beginning of the transtion, most of the
investments of the EBRD went to Finance, Telecom, Oil/Gas/Natural Resources and the
group of Other sectors. The objective was to nance infrastructure and the restructuring
of the banking and the manufacturing sectors. Thereafter, the focus of the bank switched
to the nancing of the creation of small and medium entreprises (SMEs),
4 Econometric Analysis: model and results
The EBRD selects one of 13 di¤erent available contracts (see Table 1) when deciding to
nance the investment project of a rm. The selected one should be the contract which
reduces the asymmetric information as much as possible between the principal and the
agent.
The objective of the econometric analysis is to identify the level of heterogeneity which
enables the bank to discriminate among the rms and select the contract that will incite
them to behave well. In particular, we want to verify if the bank modies its behavior when
it signs several contracts with the same rm over time. If it does, as proved by Chiappori
et alii. (1994), this means that the bank uses the historical information (memory) about
the rm to adjust the nancing conditions in order to maximize its prots.
To do so, rst, we proceed by splitting the whole sample into two subsamples: one-
contract rms and several-contract rms. The latter subsample includes historical informa-
tion on the rms and we want to check if the bank uses it. This is the way to control for
the role of memory. We apply the same econometric specication to both subsamples but
allowing for di¤erent specications of the same xed e¤ects. By comparing the results and
checking for robustness we identify the role of memory.
4.1 Econometric model
Equations 6 and15 describe respectively the one-period and several period contracts. These
equations written in a reduced form as:
Ri = Ii +D where i = firm: (16)
The amount of the money the rm i is expected to pay back (Ri) is proportional to
the return of the investment (Ii) plus a vector of other variables (D) representing the e¤ort
made by the rm in the realization of the project, its cost, and other conditions a¤ecting
16
the success of an investment. The two former variables are liked to the rmsbehavior and
the latter is associated with the uncertainty conditions in the host markets. As expressed
by equation (15) when the rm sign several contract with the bank, the vector (D) includes
the premium granted to the rm receives whenever it behaves well.
In our database, we do not have data for all the variables we have describes. Therefore,
we need to dene proxies for some of them. Among them is the variable Ri;which is the
capital plus interests that must be paid back to the bank. We have data on capital (Ci)but
not on the interest rate set by the bank for condenciality reasons. In a simple interest
contract the refund is equal:
Ri = Ci +mi(
Ciii
100
) = Ci(1 +
miii
100
);
where Ci is the capital borrowed by the rm, mi is the maturity of the credit (in number
of years) and ii is the nominal annual interest rate charged by the bank. Replacing this
expression in equation (16) we obtain
Ci(1 +
miii
100
) = Ii +D:
As a result, the capital Ci can be expressed as function of (Ii;miii; D) such as:
Ci =
Ii +D
(1 + miii100 )
= f(Ii;miii; D): (17)
where fIi > 0;i.e. the size of the credit increases with the return of the investment, and
f
miii
< 0, i.e. the size of the credit decreases with total interests.
In equation (16), the variables for which we have data are Ci (IV ) and the vector
(D):The vector of other variables (D), includes a mesure of income level of the host market
(GDP per-capita), an indicator for political institutions (degree of democray, Dem ), Time
dummies and, nally, a dummy for public institutions as clients.
For the others we need to nd proxies. The return of the investment (Ii) can be approx-
imated for a solvent rm by the value of the investment (IP , available in the database).
This is the minimum level of return of any succesfull investment.
As for total interest miii ,we make three assumptions. First, we consider that the
minimum cost of borrowing in the market is the cost of a loan, and second that the bank
will apply this rate to any other kind of contract it signs. Third, the maturity of a credit is
di¤erent for each category of contract. Finally, we know that the interest rate charged by
the EBRD is equal to Libor plus a margin (ri): Since we do not have data on the margin,
we can express it as a percentage (i) of Libor :
miii = mi(Libor + ri) = mi(Libor + iLibor)
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If we express the margin as a percentage of Libor, the previous expression can be written
as:
miii = (1 + i)mi(Libor) = imi(Libor) where i = (1 + i):
The variable i is time-invariant because the conditions of the contract are xed at the
time of the signature.
Therefore, under all these assumptions, we can approximate the value of Ri.
[Box 1 about here]
The specication used for the estimation is derives from equation (17) and can be written
as:
IVijyt  Ci = f(Ii;miii; D))
IVijyt = f(Ii;miii; D) = 1 + 2IPijyt + 3Demjt + 4GDPjt + 5DIj   (18)
7mii(Libort) + 7Y eart + 8Sectory + 9Demjt  Y eart + "
where i = firm; j=country, y = sector; t = time. The description of the variables is
given in Box 1.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8 gives descriptive statistics for some of these variables for the overall sample
period and for two years: 1993 and 2003. The dependent variable is the amount of the
credit (IV ) granted by the EBRD. This is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a
contract when the bank proposes it (as discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It embeds
the screening process that takes place across clients.
The measure of political institutions is taken from Polity IV project (2007). It is an
index varying between 0 (for an absolute autocracy) and 10 (for a fully adged demcracy).
The Polity project assigns its scores according to three criterias:
1. Institutions that allow citizens to express their preferences concerning policies and
leaders,
2. Institutional limits on the exercise of power by the executive,
3. Guarantee of daily liberties to citizens in their daily life.
In our sample this index declines over time because the EBRD nanced democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the transition and later started to nance
autocratic countries from Central Asia.
The variation of Libor (London Interbank O¤ered Rate) corresponds to the historical
variations due to changes in the credit market condition.
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According to our theoretical model and the assumptions we made, we expect that all
independent variables in equation (18) but Libor has a positive sign. An increase in Libor
implies a decrase of the amount of credit.
In order to test the level of individual heterogeneity we apply the technique of pooled
OLS versus xed e¤ects.8 In all the contracts signed by EBRD there is one individual
feature which is time invariant: mii. We will treat it as an individual xed e¤ect.
We will identify it by applying four di¤erent measures: ct2; Ct2PPRR; Ct2IPPRR;
IPPPPRR:
By running regression with ct2 as individual xed e¤ects, we do not include any historical
information for the rms. When we introduce historical information on individual rms (by
PPRR variable), it is possible to observe whether the past of rms a¤ects the conditions
of the contract proposed by the bank. If it does, we can conclude that the bank memorizes
the past information and uses it to adjust the conditions of the next contracts for each
individual rm.
4.2 Results
Our database contains all contracts signed by the bank over the period 1991-2003. We split
it into two groups: one-contract rms and several-contract rms. In order to test the role
of memory, we run regressions separately for each group of rms.
We proceed rst by assessing if the xed e¤ect model should be preferred to the pooled
OLS (with F-test) and to random e¤ect model (with Hausmans test). In all the regressions
we control for heteroskedasticity by applying the White correction. Then, we test the
di¤erent measures of induvidual xed e¤ects.
4.2.1 One-contract rms
This sample includes 1269 contracts. Since, to each contract corresponds a rm we do
not have historical information of the rms. Therefore we can only test one measure of
individual xed e¤ects (ct2). This is a qualitative variable that identies each type of the
13 contracts.
[Table 9 about here]
[Table 10 about here]
The results of the F-test and the Hausman test show that the xed e¤ect model should
be preferred to the pooled and random e¤ects model (Tables 9 and 10). In addition, the
fraction of the variance due to xed e¤ects () is particularly high (0.70). The estimates of
8The econometric estimations have been computed with Stata 9.0 package.
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 suggests that almost three quarters of the variation in the amount of a credit is related
to the di¤erent types of contracts (Baltagi, 2005 and Baum, 2006).
In the xed e¤ect estimations, the coe¢ cients of all the explanatory variables (when
they are statistically signicant) display the expected sign.
The repayment capacity of the rm is always highly signicant.
All dummy variables are always statistically signicant. The public identity of a client
turns out to be important for the bank because a public client can,perhaps, be considered
by the bank as less risky than a private one. The signicance of interaction term between
democracy (DEM) and the time dummy means the more democratic a country is over time
the larger is the size of the credit o¤ered by the bank. This result either tends to conrm
the o¢ cial claim that the EBRD promotes democratic institutions in transition countries
or means that a country moving to democracy (over time) o¤ers more protable investment
opportunities.
To sum up, for the one-contract rms the individual xed e¤ects by type of contract
turn out to be a good measure to identify individual heterogeneity. Each contract signed
by the bank is granted according to the individual characteristic of the client.
4.2.2 Several-contract rms
This sample includes 346 contracts. Now, to a rm corresponds more than one contract.
Therefore, we have historical information on each individual rm and we can control for it.
Given this characteristic, we want to check whether the individual heterogeneity we indenti-
ed in the previous sample holds in the present sample. Thus, we repeat the previous entire
exercise for this sample. In order to control for heteroskedasticity we alternatively apply
the White and the cluster correction. The cluster correction is important for controlling the
autocorrelation in the residuals because each rm appears more than once in the sample.
[Table 11 about here]
[Table 12 about here]
The previous exercise for this sample yields a rst important result: individual xed
e¤ects by type of contract do not capture the individual heterogeneity (Table 11 and 12).
First, the F-test is weakly signicant or insignicant while the Hausmans strongly
rejects the random e¤ect model. As a result we conclude that the model with individual
xed e¤ects by type of contract is not robust estimation technique for this sample. This
conclusion is reinforced by the low level of  (0.07-0.12) of these estimations.
Therefore, we need to look for other measures of individual xed e¤ects for controlling
individual heterogeneity. To this end we will exploit the historical information included
in this sample by testing the three remaining measures of individual xed e¤ects previ-
ously dened: Ct2PPRR; Ct2IPPRR; IPPPPRR: Each of these measures contains this
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historical information because it takes into account the information associated to the rst
contract signed by each rm (PPRR). The variable IPPPPRR represents the project
value of the rst contract, the variable Ct2PPRR is the type of the rst signed contract
and Ct2IPPRR is the combination among the two others. The present exercise yields the
second important result of the paper: the individual xed e¤ects by the project value of
the rst contract accounts for individual heterogeneity in this sample.
[Table 13 about here]
[Table 14 about here]
[Table 15 about here]
The F-test and Hausmans test (Table13, Table 14 and Table 15) imply that the xed-
e¤ect model is always preferred. Whenever the project value of the rst contract is included
in the individual xed e¤ects the value of  goes up strongly. However, when we only
consider the type of the rst contract, the level of  remains low.
In addition, the project value (IP ) and Libor are always statistically signicant and
have the expected sign. We introduce an additional variable (IPDSY ) representing the
case that a rm receives more than one contract in the same year. In this sample we need
to control for these observations because they cannot be associated to a fully memory e¤ect.
In the meanwhile, we cannot drop them from the sample because of the nature of the bank-
client relationship. We obtain a positive and always statistical signicant coe¢ cient. This
result can be interpreted as an evidence that the bank has a further device to control better
the riskness of the investments proposed by these rms.
Regarding the dummy variables, we obtain the same results as those of the one-contract
rm sample expect for the dummy of public client. In the present sample, this dummy is
never signicant, which reinforces our conclusions that the banks behavior relies strongly
on memory. In the previous sample, the absence of historical information was o¤set by the
reliance on the other variables, notably by the identity of public client.
Memory allows the bank to discriminate rms according to their individual historical
characteristics and o¤er tailored contracts to better control risk. As discrimination e¤ect,
it can be observed that the number of groups inside this sub-sample increases from 8 to
90/94 thank to the memory e¤ect.
5 Conclusions
Contract theory has proved that the optimal contract generally exhibits memory in repeated
contracts with moral hazard. It has turned out to be di¢ cult to clearly identify it in the
empirical literature on long-term contracting in nancial intermediation. Considering that
the method used so far in this literature is awed, we proposed in this paper an alternative
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empirical method based on the separation of observations between short-term and long-term
contracts. We argue that this procedure is required to control for the adverse selection e¤ect
in the banks lending policy. Nevertheless this is not su¢ cient. The e¤ect of memory on
moral hazard can be a¤ected by the competition e¤ect in the banking industry making
it hard to isolate. The dataset we built from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development allows for achieving it. The EBRD has been in a situation of monopoly in
many transition countries especially at the outset of the transition process. Moreover, its
shareholders are sovereign and assigned to the bank the mission to foster and not crowd
out nancial ows towards the private sector in these countries. Our results yield two
conclusions. First, they unambiguously identify the role of memory in the banks lending
decisions when the rms have signed more than one contract. Second, they conrm the
relevance of the empirical method we propose to control for the adverse selection e¤ect,
which, to our opinion, explain the inconclusive results that is generally observed in the
empirical literature. However, we think that these results will be hard to replicate with
datasets from private banks.
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6 List of table
Table 1: EBRD contracts and their frequency (1991-2003)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Contract Freq. %
Debt 1 0.06
Equity 141 7.92
Guarantee 100 5.62
Line of Credit 7 0.39
Loan 949 53.31
Loan/Line of credit 1 0.06
Loan/Shares 96 5.39
Loan/guarantee 1 0.06
Senior debt 72 4.04
Shares 404 22.70
Shares/Loan 2 0.11
Shares/Loan/Share 1 0.06
Share/Loan/Guarantee 1 0.06
Subordinated debt 4 0.22
TOTAL 1780 100
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on loans (value e mill. )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample9
Bank nancing 945 21.25 27.76 12.7 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 936 60.81 109.94 29.25 0.1 923.9
Up to 1995
Bank nancing 219 19.98 23.53 10.90 0.2 142
Tot. project value 220 68.24 115.81 31.85 0.5 923.9
From 2000 on
Bank nancing 438 21.19 31.36 10.00 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 427 50.60 94.94 15.00 0.1 750
9The di¤erence between the number of observation in bank nancing and total project value is due to
lack of data for one of the two variables.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on shares (value e mill.)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank nancing 402 9.05 13.93 3.2 0.1 125
Tot. project value 402 34.57 76.98 8.2 0.1 1028.9
Up to 1995
Bank nancing 84 10.14 11.82 5.9 0.1 53.4
Tot. project value 84 35.92 59.96 18.6 0.7 384.1
From 2000 on
Bank nancing 100 7.45 11.95 3.1 0.3 53.7
Tot. project value 99 26.87 63.57 4.8 0.5 365.8
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on several-contract rms (value e mill. )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank nancing 405 11.97 17.75 6.6 0.5 130
Tot. project value 395 28.7 56.3 8.7 0.5 651.3
Up to 1995
Bank nancing 59 16.47 20.83 8.8 0.5 109.8
Tot. project value 59 36.25 53.61 20.8 1.3 329.6
From 2000 on
Bank nancing 219 11.78 18.87 5.6 0.1 130
Tot. project value 202 28.63 65.32 7.9 0.1 651.3
Table 6: Descriptive statistics: cumulated investment by region (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Regions 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Russia 19.9 29.1 28.8
Central Europe and Baltic States 45.9 32.9 36.0
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 11.8 11.9 7.5
South-Eastern Europe 16.8 13.5 20.5
Central Asia 5.6 12.6 7.2
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics: cumulated investment by sector (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Sector 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Finance 19.6 27.0 30.2
Environment .. 4.1 ..
Food 2.6 8.1 9.0
Telecom 14.5 6.8 4.9
Energy 9.5 9.7 8.9
Oil/Gas/Nat.Res. 10.8 10.3 8.4
Transport 8.8 3.4 16.1
Others 34.3 30.6 22.4
BOX 1: LIST OF VARIABLES
Ct2 Type of contract signed by the EBRD (13 possible contracts)
DEM Index of democraticlevel in the country hosting the investment (Polity IV, 2007)
DI Dummy variable for presence of a public client or other interests of the bank in the project
DSY Dummy for investments nanced by the EBRD for the same rm in the same year
GDP Gross domestic product per-capita of the host country (IMF statistics, 2007)
IP Total value of the investment project
IPDSY Value of projects for rms obtaining more than one credit the same year
IV Value of the investment nanced by the EBRD
Libor Average annual value of Libor interest rate at 12 months.
PPRR Dummy for the rst contract signed by the EBRD with rms obtaining more than one credit
Sector Dummy by sector
Year Time dummy
Ct2PPRR Interaction term between Ct2 and PPPRR
Ct2IPPRR Interaction term among Ct2, IP and PPPRR
IPPPPRR Interaction term between IP and PPPRR
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Sample
Libor 1788 4.23 1.45 2.17 9.91
GDP per-capita ($) 1706 2706.5 2143.6 151.48 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 1662 6.5 2.85 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill. ) 1766 16.5 24.2 0 233.7
Total project value (e mill. ) 1750 49.23 97.87 0 1028.9
Financing share 1728 0.6 0.33 0.009 1
1993
Libor 71 7.24 0 7.24 7.24
GDP per-capita ($) 68 2167 1519.7 225.8 6801.8
Polity IV index (DEM) 68 7.32 2.45 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 71 20.36 23.9 0.1 100.12
Total project value (e mill.) 71 69.98 96.95 1.3 464.7
Financing share 71 0.43 0.28 0.04 1
2003
Libor 272 2.17 0 2.17 2.17
GDP per-capita ($) 260 3292.8 2539.6 248.2 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 254 6.61 3.04 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 270 13.69 23.7 0.1 230.2
Total project value(e mill.) 271 33.26 77.4 0.1 750
Financing share 270 0.69 0.34 0.01 1
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Table 9
Econometric results: One-contract rms
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error, Dependent varibale : IV
OLS OLS
C 14.75 (6.9)** 8.38(7.56)
IP 0.15 (0.02)*** 0.15(0.02)***
DI 8.12(2.71)*** 8.00(2.75)***
Dem -0.21(0.19) dropped
Libor -1.78 (0.73)** 0.32(0.92)
GDP 0.0004(0.0003) 0.0004(0.0003)
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years no yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 2.61*** 0.89
D. Sectors=0 4.47*** 3.20***
DEM*year=0 1.55*
DEM*year=D. Years
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk
Adj. R-Square 0.51 0.51
OBS 1269 1269
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 10
Econometric results: One-contract rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects, Value in brackets: Std Error, Dependent varibale : IV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 14.7 (6.77)** -8.78 (-0.57)
IP 0.16 (0.02)*** 0.15(0.006)***
DI 7.19 (2.72)*** 7.12 (2.04)***
Dem -0.14 (0.19) dropped
Libor -2.03(0.70)*** 3.94 (2.82)
GDP 0.0005(0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003)
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years no yes
Fixed e¤ects Ct2 Ct2
Tests:
Hausman Test (2) 11.20** 17.18***
F-test: xed vs pooled 4.33*** 4.57***
D. Years=0 3.03*** 0.98
D. Sectors=0 2.02*** 1.73**
DEM*year=0 1.82**
u 27.75 28.63
 0.70 0.71
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk
R-Square (within) 0.48 0.49
OBS 1265 1265
Groups 13 13
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 11
Econometric results: several-contract rms
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error, De-
pendent varibale : IV
OLS OLS OLS
C 14.57 (10.14) 0.44(3.65) 14.57 (7.34)**
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21(0.03)*** 0.22 (0.032)***
DI 1.96 (4.11) 1.97 (4.06) 1.96 (0.62)
Dem dropped -0.19(0.19) dropped
Libor -5.58 (4.42) 0.67 (1.18) -5.58 (3.04)*
GDP 0.0007 (0.0004)* 0.0007 (0.0004)** 0.0007 (0.0004)*
IPDSY 0.34 (0.12)*** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.34 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
DEM*years yes no yes
Tests:
D. Years= 0 1.81* 0.69 2.07**
D. Sectors=0 3.30*** 4.20*** 2.99***
DEM*year=0 1.52 2.16**
DEM*year=D. Years 3.06***
Robustness errors Heterosk Heterosk Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.65 0.64 0.65
OBS 346 346 346
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 12
Econometric results: several-contract rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects (with error correction ), Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent varibale : IV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 1.43 (10.39) -2.84 (4.95) 13.43 (7.60)*
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)***
DI 1.14 (4.57) 1.37 (4.50) 1.14(4.36)
Dem dropped -0.11(0.21) dropped
Libor -5.34(4.43) 0.85 (1.22) -5.34 (3.04)*
GDP 0.0009(0.0004)** 0.001 (0.0004)** 0.0009(0.0004*)
IPDSY 0.34 (0.12)*** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.34 (0.11)***
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
DEM*years yes no yes
Fixed e¤ects ct2 ct2 ct2
Tests:
Hausman Test (2) 18.32***
F-test: xed vs pooled 1.85* 1.65
D. Years= 0 1.7* 0.51 2.05**
D. Sectors=0 3.15*** 4.42*** 3.22***
DEM*year=0 1.68* 2.42***
DEM*year=D. Years 1.49 2.81***
u 4.21 3.20 4.21
 0.12 0.07 0.12
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Cluster
R-Square (within) 0.48 0.64 0.65
OBS 344 344 344
Groups 8 8 8
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 13
Econometric results: several-contract rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error, De-
pendent varibale : IV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 23.13 (6.68)*** 23.13 (5.44)***
IP 0.19 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)***
DI -2.08 (5.59) -2.08 (4.45)
Dem dropped dropped
Libor -9.08(2.01)*** -9.08(1.6)***
GDP 0.0008(0.0006) 0.0008(0.0006)
IPDSY 0.40 (0.14)*** 0.40 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years yes yes
Fixed e¤ects IPPPRR IPPPRR
Tests:
Hausman Test (2) 91.33***
F-test: xed vs pooled 1.52***
D. Years= 0 6.59*** 6.59***
D. Sectors=0 1.65* 1.65*
DEM*year=0 22.66*** 22.66***
DEM*year=D. Years 24.51*** 24.51***
u 14.55 14.55
 0.65 0.65
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.66 0.66
OBS 346 346
Groups 90 90
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 14
Econometric results: several-contract rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error, De-
pendent varibale : IV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 27.82 (7.51)*** 27.82 (6.10)***
IP 0.19 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)***
DI -2.27 (5.68) -2.27 (4.53)
Dem dropped dropped
Libor -9.01(2.02)*** -9.01(1.6)***
GDP 0.0008(0.0007) 0.0008(0.0006)
IPDSY 0.40 (0.14)*** 0.40 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years yes yes
Fixed e¤ects CT2IPPRR CT2IPPRR
Tests:
Hausman Test (2) 63.79***
F-test: xed vs pooled 1.46**
D. Years= 0 3.94*** 6.69***
D. Sectors=0 1.60* 2.36***
DEM*year=0 7.17*** 22.66***
DEM*year=D. Years 7.77*** 23.96***
u 14.55 14.55
 0.64 0.64
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.66 0.66
OBS 346 346
Groups 94 94
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 15
Econometric results: several-contract rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error, De-
pendent varibale : IV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 22.51 (9.04)** 22.51 (7.00)**
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)***
DI 1.11(4.03) 1.11(3.87)
Dem dropped dropped
Libor -6.40 (3.68)* -6.40 (2.65)**
GDP 0.0008(0.0004)* 0.0008(0.0004)*
IPDSY 0.38 (0.12)*** 0.38 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years yes yes
Fixed e¤ects CT2PPRR CT2PPRR
Tests:
Hausman Test (2) na10
F-test: xed vs pooled 2.73*
D. Years= 0 2.27** 2.73***
D. Sectors=0 3.09*** 2.80***
DEM*year=0 1.93** 3.02***
DEM*year=D. Years 2.11** 4.30***
u 5.51 5.51
 0.19 0.19
Robustness errors Heterosk Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.66 0.66
OBS 346 346
Groups 8 8
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
10We experience problems in running this test with this xed e¤ect either in the current and the reduced
form. The variable (CT2PPRR) contain a big mass of zero values and, hence, the model tted fails to meet
the asympothic assumption of the Hausman test.
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A List of sectors
The following table gather all the sectors rms asking for a nancement belong to:
Bank, Finance and holding Local servicies (water, waste...)
Chemical (includ. Pharmacy) Media
Education and other public services Manufacturing
Electrictronical and Hi-Tech Metal
Energy Natural resources
Environment Oil and gas
Food and beverage (incl. agriculture) Real estates
Health and personal care Telecommunication
Hotels and tourism Trade and retails
Infrastructure (transport) Vehicles
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